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Abstract
Shapley’s impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no
non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although
the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two agents, none of the
well known bargaining solutions are ordinal. Searching for meaningful ordinal solutions,
especially for the bilateral bargaining problem, has been a challenging issue in bargaining
theory for more than three decades. This paper proposes a logic-based ordinal solution
to the bilateral bargaining problem. We argue that if a bargaining problem is modeled in
terms of the logical relation of players’ physical negotiation items, a meaningful bargaining
solution can be constructed based on the ordinal structure of bargainers’ preferences. We
represent bargainers’ demands in propositional logic and bargainers’ preferences over their
demands in total preorder. We show that the solution satisfies most desirable logical
properties, such as individual rationality (logical version), consistency, collective rationality
as well as a few typical game-theoretic properties, such as weak Pareto optimality and
contraction invariance. In addition, if all players’ demand sets are logically closed, the
solution satisfies a fixed-point condition, which says that the outcome of a negotiation is
the result of mutual belief revision. Finally, we define various decision problems in relation
to our bargaining model and study their computational complexity.
1. Introduction
Bargaining has been a central research topic in economics for over five decades and has
become an interesting issue in computer science in recent years (Osborne & Rubinstein,
1990; Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994; Muthoo, 1999). In his ground-breaking paper, Nash
(1950) models a bargaining problem as a pair (S, d), where S ⊆ <2 is a subset of two-
dimensional Euclidean space (feasible set), representing a set of utility pairs that can be
derived from bargainers’ preferences on feasible outcomes, and d is a point in D designated
to be the “disagreement point”. A bargaining solution is then a function that assigns each
bargaining problem (S, d) a point in S (Thomson, 1994).
The Nash bargaining model presumes that bargainers’ preferences are represented by
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, referred to as cardinal utility (Myerson, 1991). Under
such an assumption, two utility functions can be viewed as the same if one can be derived
from the other by an affine positive transformation. Thus a bargaining solution based on
Nash’s bargaining model should be invariant under any affine positive transformations.
However, traditional economic theory considers bargaining problems in which players’ pref-
erences are represented in ordinal (Calvo & Peters, 2005). Therefore, ideally, a bargaining
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solution should be invariant under any order-preserving transformations on utilities. This
property is referred to as ordinal invariance in the game-theoretic literature (Thomson,
1994). A bargaining solution that possesses such a property is called an ordinal solution.
Obviously, ordinal bargaining solutions are more desirable than cardinal solutions because
ordinal information about players’ preferences is easier to elicit than cardinal preferences
and the corresponding solutions can be more robust (Sakovics, 2004; Calvo & Peters, 2005).
However, none of the well known bargaining solutions (Nash, 1950; Kalai & Smorodinsky,
1975; Kalai, 1977; Perles & Maschler, 1981) are ordinal. In fact, Shapley (1969) showed
that for the two-person bargaining problem (bilateral bargaining) there is no non-trivial
(i.e., strongly individual rational) ordinal solution1. The result is generally referred to as
Shapley’s impossibility result in the game-theoretic literature.
Shapley’s negative result obviously discouraged the investigation of ordinal bargaining,
notwithstanding Shapley himself demonstrated ten years later that ordinal solutions exist
for the three-person bargaining problem (Shubik, 1982). The study of ordinal bargaining
theory did not regain the focus of game theory until very recently. Kibris (2001) provided an
axiomatic characterization for an ordinal solution of the three-person bargaining problem
based on Nash’s bargaining model2. Safra and Samet (2004) extended the result to the
bargaining problems with more than three players. Rubinstein et al. (1992) and O’Neill et
al. (2004) investigated the ordinal bargaining problem by varying Nash’s bargaining model.
Calvo and Perers (2005) explored the problem of ordinal bargaining in which at least one
player is cardinal. Nevertheless, the problem of ordinal bargaining is still considered to be an
unsolved problem. Most of these pierces of work focus on the existence of ordinal solutions.
None of these proposed solutions gains strong intuitive support. Looking for meaningful
ordinal bargaining solutions is still an outstanding problem in game theory (Sakovics, 2004).
To show the difficulty of ordinal bargaining, let us consider a simple but typical bargaining
scenario:
Example 1 (Muthoo, 1999) Two players, A and B, bargain over the partition of a cake.
Let xi be the share of the cake in percentage to player i (i = A,B). The set of possible
agreements is represented by Ω = {(xA, xB) : 0 ≤ xA ≤ 100 and xB = 100− xA}. For each
xi ∈ [0, 100], ui(xi) is player i’s utility from obtaining a share xi of the cake.
Assume that player A has a linear utility scale of its share, uA(xA) = xA, and player
B has a utility scale that is proportional to the square of his share, uB(xB) = x2B. Fail-
ure to agree is rated 0 by both A and B. Consider two most influential bargaining solu-
tions: Nash’s solution (Nash, 1950) and Kalai-Smorodinsky’s solution (Kalai & Smorodin-
sky, 1975). It is easy to calculate that Nash’s bargaining solution to the problem gives the
outcome (33.3, 66.7) and Kalai-Smorodinsky’s solution gives (38.2, 61.8). Both solutions are
in favor of player B. This is because player B is less risk-averse (has concave utility) than
player A (has linear utility). For both Nash’s solution and Kalai-Smorodinsky’s solution,
risk-loving players has advantage in bargaining comparing to risk-neutral and risk-averse
players (see Roth’s book, 1979a, p.35-60). Now consider an order-preserving transformation
τ(x) =
√
x on player B’s utility. The transformed utility of player B becomes linear. Under
1. See the work of Thomson (1994) for an easy proof.
2. The original work was not formally published. Kibris (2004) gave a brief note.
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the new utility scales, both Nash’s solution and Kalai-Smorodinsky’s solution give (50, 50)
as outcome. This means that none of the solutions is ordinally invariant.
This example clearly shows that the non-linearity of utility functions, which expresses
the risk posture of a player, determines the outcomes of bargaining but collapses under or-
dinal transformations. In other words, ordinal transformations filter out useful information
that is expressible by cardinal utility but not expressible by ordinal utility. This explains
why “no resolution of the two-player bargaining problem can be made on the basis of ordinal
utility alone .... A satisfactory theory of bilateral bargaining requires knowledge of some-
thing more than just an ordering of the bargainers’ preferences” (see Shubik’s book, 1982,
p.94-98).
All in all, ordinal preference is insufficient to fully specify a bargaining situation. A
bargaining model must supply a way to express the information additional to ordinal pref-
erences, such as bargainers’ attitude towards risk. This article aims to demonstrate with an
ordinal solution to the bilateral bargaining problem that the language of logic can be used
to express the knowledge that is required for modeling bargaining with ordinal preferences.
In recent years, the studies on logic-based frameworks of bargaining and negotiation
have received considerable attention in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) (Sycara, 1990;
Kraus, Sycara, & Evenchik, 1998; Parsons, Sierra, & Jennings, 1998; Zhang, Foo, Meyer,
& Kwok, 2004; Meyer, Foo, Kwok, & Zhang, 2004; Zhang, 2005, 2007). These frameworks
utilize logical languages to represent bargaining situations so that physical negotiation items,
bargaining conflicts, players’ beliefs and mutual threats can be explicitly expressed, which
differentiates themselves from the traditional game-theoretic models. In this paper we
propose an ordinal solution to the bilateral bargaining problem based on the logical model
introduced by Zhang and Zhang (2006a).
The organization of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the formal model of
bargaining. We will use a finite propositional language to describe bargainers’ demands.
The bargainers’ preferences on their demands are sorted in total preorder. A bargaining
problem is then defined as a pair of hierarchies of two parties’ demand sets. The construction
of the bargaining solution, presented in Section 3, is based on the idea that each party tries
to maximize their prior demands to be included in the final agreement while keeping the
outcome to be consistent. The approach can be viewed as an extension of Nebel’s prioritized
base revision to the two-agent setting (Nebel, 1992). Section 4 and Section 5 are devoted
to the discussions on the properties of the proposed solution. We shall prove in Section
4 that the solution satisfies most desirable logical properties, such as the logical version
of Individual Rationality, Consistency and Collective Rationality. More extraordinarily,
we shall show that the solution satisfies a desirable fixed-point condition introduced by
Zhang et al. (2004), which says that the outcome of bargaining is the result of mutual
belief revision. Section 5 focuses on the discussion of the game-theoretic properties of the
solution. We prove that the solution satisfies Weak Pareto Optimality, Restricted Symmetry
and Contraction Invariance. Section 6 is devoted to a discussion of how bargainers’ attitudes
towards risk are represented in our model and how they determine players’ bargaining power.
Section 7 investigates the complexity issues related to the proposed model. We consider four
major decision problems in relation to a bargaining game and provide their computational
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complexity results. The final two sections conclude the work with a discussion of the related
work.
The paper is made to be self-contained. However, the reader will find that basic knowl-
edge in belief revision and game-theoretic bargaining theory can be helpful for a better
understanding of the concepts introduced in the paper. For an introductory survey of the
areas, see Ga¨rdenfors’s article (1992) and Thomson’s article (1994), respectively.
2. Representation of Bargaining Problems
As we have seen in Example 1, an ordinal solution to the bilateral bargaining problem
requires information in addition to ordinal preferences. In order to express such extra in-
formation, we model a bargaining situation in two aspects: the physical bargaining terms,
described in propositional logic, and the ordering of the bargainers’ preferences on their
bargaining terms, described in total preorder. Since the bilateral bargaining is the most
challenging problem to bargaining theory, we shall restrict ourselves to the bargaining prob-
lem with only two players.
2.1 Preliminaries
We assume that each party has a set of negotiation items, referred to as demand set,
described by a finite propositional language L. The language consists of a finite set of
propositional variables and the propositional connectives ¬, ∨,∧, → and ↔ with standard
syntax and semantics. The logical closure operator Cn is defined as Cn(X) = {ϕ : X ` ϕ},
where X is a set of sentences. We say X to be logically closed or a belief set if X = Cn(X).
If X and Y are two sets of sentences, X + Y denotes Cn(X ∪ Y ).
Suppose that X1 and X2 are two sets of sentences. To simplify exploration, we use X−i
to represent the other set among X1 and X2 if Xi is one of them. If D is a vector of two
components, D1 and D2 will represent each component of D.
2.2 Bargaining Games
As shown in the previous section, cardinal utility encodes two types of information: bargain-
ers’ attitude towards risk (via non-linearity of utility functions) and bargainers’ preferences
on possible outcomes (via the ordering of utility values). One may ask whether a theory of
bargaining can be based purely on ordinal information about preferences. In order to inves-
tigate such a possibility, Osborne and Rubinstein introduced a different way to represent a
bargaining situation, with which the preference information is separated from the physical
bargaining terms (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1990). Precisely, they define a bargaining prob-
lem as a four-tuple (X,D,≥1,≥2), where X is a set of feasible outcomes (in physical terms),
D is the disagreement event, and ≥i is a complete transitive reflexive ordering over the set
X ∪ D, representing bargainer i’s preferences. As shown by Example 1, however, simply
describing physical bargaining terms without specifying their relations does not suffice to
lead to an ordinal solution (see also Osborne & Rubinstein’s book, 1990, p.32). In this
paper, we further extend Osborne & Rubinstein’s model in such a way that the physical
negotiation items are represented in logical formulae.
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Definition 1 A bargaining game is a pair ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)), where Xi (i = 1, 2) is a
logically consistent set of sentences in L and ºi is a complete transitive reflexive order
(total preorder or weak order) over Xi that satisfies the following logical constraint3:
(LC) If ϕ1, · · · , ϕn ` ψ, then there is k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) such that ψ ºi ϕk.
We call the pair (Xi,ºi) the prioritized demand set of player i. For any ϕ,ψ ∈ Xi, ψ Âi ϕ
denotes that ψ ºi ϕ and ϕ 6ºi ψ. ψ ≈i ϕ denotes that ψ ºi ϕ and ϕ ºi ψ.
Intuitively, a bargaining game is the formal representation of a bargaining situation in
which each player describes his demands in logical formulae and expresses his preferences
on his demands in total preorder. We assume that each player has consistent demands. The
preference ordering of each player reflects the degree of entrenchment in which the player
defends his demands. The logical constraint LC says that if the demand ψ is a logical
consequence of the demands ϕ1, · · · , ϕn, then ψ should not be less entrenched than all the
ϕi because if you fail to defend ψ, at least one of the ϕi has to be dropped (otherwise you
would not have lost ψ). It is easy to see that such an ordering is similar to Ga¨denfors and
Makinson’s epistemic entrenchment (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson, 1988). In fact, the logical
constraint LC, introduced by Zhang and Foo (2001), is actually the combination of the
postulates EE2 and EE3 of epistemic entrenchment ordering.
Observation 1 Let º be a total preorder on X. The logical constraint LC is equivalent to
the conjunction of the following conditions:
1. If ϕ ` ψ, then ψ º ϕ.
2. Either ϕ ∧ ψ º ϕ or ϕ ∧ ψ º ψ.
Proof: It is easy to verify that LC implies these two conditions. We now prove that the
conditions imply LC by induction on n. Obviously, LC holds when n = 1. Assume that LC
holds when n = l. Suppose that ϕ1, · · · , ϕl−1, ϕl, ϕl+1 ` ψ, then ϕ1, · · · , ϕl−1, (ϕl∧ϕl+1) ` ψ.
By the inductive assumption, either ψ º ϕl ∧ ϕl+1 or there is k (1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1) such that
ψ º ϕk. If ψ º ϕl ∧ ϕl+1, by the condition 2 and transitivity of º, either ψ º ϕl or
ψ º ϕl+1. Therefore in any case there is k (1 ≤ k ≤ l + 1) such that ψ º ϕk. ¶
We remark that the preference ordering represents how firmly an agent entrenches her
demands rather than her gain or payoff4. For instance, suppose that p1 represents the
demand of a seller “the price of the good is no less than $10” and p2 denotes “the price
of the good is no less than $8”. Obviously the seller could get higher payoff from p1 than
p2. However, since p1 implies p2, she will entrench p2 no less firmly than p1, i.e., p2 º p1,
3. A complete transitive reflexive order, i.e., total preorder or weak order, satisfies the following properties:
• Completeness or totality: ϕ º ψ or ψ º ϕ.
• Reflexivity: ϕ º ϕ.
• Transitivity: if ϕ º ψ and ψ º χ then ϕ º χ.
4. We will define bargainers’ gains in Section 5.1.
437
Zhang & Zhang
because, if she fails to keep p1, she can still bargain for p2 but the loss of p2 means the loss
of both.
There is another significant difference between our model of bargaining and the game-
theoretic model. The game-theoretic model abstracts a bargaining situation into a numerical
game. The demands, preferences and risk posture of a player are all represented in utility
values. In our model, however, these factors are abstracted into logical statements and
ordering on these statement, i.e., a prioritized demand set. Note that we have endowed
the word “demand” with a broad meaning. In our model, a demand of a player can be
everything that is related to the negotiation and that the player wants to keep in the final
agreement. It can be a physical item the player wants to obtain from the other party. It can
also be a piece of knowledge, a belief, a goal, a constraint or even a thread, whatever, the
player wants to keep in the agreement. Different from the logics for rational agency, such
as the BDI logics, we do not distinguish knowledge, belief, goal from the “real” demands.
For instance, a logical tautology can be a demand of a player if the player considers that
it should be included in the final agreement. Consider Example 1 again. Typical demands
of player A are xA ≥ 40, xA ≥ 50, xA ≥ 60, and so on5, which mean that the player
wants to get a share of the cake no less than 40%, 50%, 60%, · · ·. Player B’s demands
are the opposite, say xB ≥ 40, xB ≥ 50, xB ≥ 60, · · ·. Besides these “real” demands,
there are a set of domain constraints in the players’ demand sets, such as xA + xB ≤ 100,
xA ≥ y → xA ≥ z and xB ≥ y → xB ≥ z whenever y ≥ z. These constraints link all
the demands of the players together, therefore, play an important rule in the determination
of bargaining outcomes. For instance, we cannot have both xA ≥ 55 and xB ≥ 55 in
the final agreement because they are inconsistent with the constraints. One may wonder
what if a player does not include these constraints in her demand set. In this case, the
player would have to accept unreasonable results, such as xA ≥ 55 and xB ≥ 55. In other
words, if “we idealize the bargaining problem by assuming that the two individuals are highly
rational” (see the work of Nash, 1950, p.155), we should assume that these constraints and
background knowledge are included in the demand set of each player (see more discussions
on this example in Section 6). Again, the ordering of demand sets does not reflect the gains
of a player as we mentioned above. It is very likely that a rational agent could give her
highest priority to the above mentioned constraints and background knowledge since she
might be never going to give up these fundamental rules.
The following example shows that our model is more suitable for discrete domain of
problems.
Example 2 A couple are making their family budget for the next year. The husband wants
to change his car to a new fancy model and have a domestic holiday. The wife is going to
implement her dream of a romantic trip to Europe and suggests to redecorate their kitchen.
Both of them know that they can’t have two holidays in one year. They also realize that
they cannot afford a new car and an overseas holiday in the same year without getting a
loan from the bank. However, the wife does not like the idea of borrowing money.
In order to represent the situation in logic, let c denote “buy a new car”, d stand for
“domestic holiday”, o for “overseas holiday”, k for “kitchen redecoration” and l for “loan”.
5. Note that the player may have different demands at different stages of negotiation.
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Then ¬(d ∧ o) means that it is impossible to have both domestic holiday and overseas
holiday. The statement (c ∧ o) → l says that if they want to buy a new car and also have
an overseas holiday, they have to get a loan from the bank.
With the above symbolization, we can express the husband’s demands in the following
set:
X1 = {c, d,¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l}
Similarly, the wife’s demands can be represented by:
X2 = {o, k,¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l,¬l}
Let us assume that the husband’s preferences over his demands are:
¬(d ∧ o) ≈1 (c ∧ o)→ l Â1 c Â1 d
and the wife’s preferences are:
¬(d ∧ o) ≈2 (c ∧ o)→ l Â2 o Â2 k Â2 ¬l
Note that both agents give the common beliefs: ¬(d ∧ o) and (c ∧ o) → l the highest
priority. This reflects that the couple are rational. We shall see that these common beliefs
play important role in the determination of bargaining solution.
From the above example, we can also see the differences between our model and Osborne
& Rubinstein’s model (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1990). First, the demand sets X1 and X2
in our model represent players’ physical demands rather than feasible outcomes (note that
the two players share the same feasible set X in Osborne & Rubinstein’s model). In our
model, the feasible set is generated from the demand sets through a procedure of conflict
resolving (see Definition 2 and Example 3). Secondly, we do not have a representation of
disagreements. If a negotiation ends with disagreement, we simply assume that the agree-
ment is empty. Thirdly, in Osborne & Rubinstein’s model, the items in X are independent,
while in our model, the items from both players’ demand sets are related through their
logical relations and the orderings (via LC). This allows us to represent bargainers’ attitude
towards risk.
2.3 Hierarchy of Demands
Before we construct our bargaining solution, we present the basic properties of prioritized
demand sets. Consider a prioritized demand set (X,º) for a single agent. We define
recursively a hierarchy, {Xj}+∞j=1, of X with respect to the ordering º as follows:
1. X1 = {ϕ ∈ X : ∀ψ ∈ X(ϕ º ψ)}; T 1 = X\X1.
2. Xj+1 = {ϕ ∈ T j : ∀ψ ∈ T j(ϕ º ψ)}; T j+1 = T j\Xj+1.
The intuition behind the construction is the following: at each stage of the construction,
we collects all the maximal elements from the current demand set and remove them from
the set for the next stage of the construction. It is easy to see that there exists a number
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n such that X =
n⋃
j=1
Xj due to the logical constraint LC6. Therefore a demand set X can
be always written as X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xn, where Xj ∩Xk = ∅ for any j 6= k (see Figure 1). Also
X1
X2
...
Xn
most entrenched
least entrenched
E
E
E
E
E
¦
¦
¦
¦
¦A
A
¢
¢
Figure 1: The hierarchy of a demand set.
for any ϕ ∈ Xj and ψ ∈ Xk, ϕ Â ψ if and only if j < k. In other words, the prioritized
demand set (X,º) uniquely determines a partition of X,
n⋃
j=1
Xj , with a total order over
the partition. Therefore, the concept of prioritized demand set is equivalent to the concept
of so-called nicely-ordered partition of a belief set7, introduced by Zhang and Foo (Zhang
& Foo, 2001), if the demand set is logically closed.
In the sequent, we write X≤k to denote
k⋃
j=1
Xj .
2.4 Prioritized Base Revision
Once we have a hierarchy of the demand set for each agent, we are able to define a belief
revision operator for each agent by following Nebel’s prioritized base revision (Nebel, 1992)8.
We define a revision function ⊗ as follows:
For any demand set (X,¹) and a set F of sentences,
X ⊗ F def=
⋂
H∈X⇓F
(H + F ),
where X ⇓ F is defined as: H ∈ X ⇓ F if and only if
1. H ⊆ X,
2. for all k (k = 1, 2, · · ·), H ∩Xk is a maximal subset of Xk such that
k⋃
j=1
(H ∩Xj)∪F
is consistent.
In other words, H is a maximal subset of X that is consistent with F and gives priority to
the higher ranked items. The following result will be used in Section 4.
Lemma 1 (Nebel, 1992) If X is logically closed, then ⊗ satisfies all AGM postulates.
6. Note that X can be an infinite set even though the language is finite.
7. A nicely-ordered partition of a belief set K is a triple (K,℘,≥), where ℘ is a partition of K and ≥ is a
total order on ℘ that satisfies the logical constraint LC. See the work of Zhang and Foo (2001) p.540.
8. The idea of the construction can be traced back to Poole and Brewka’s approach to default logic (Brewka,
1989; Poole, 1988).
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3. Bargaining Solution
In Nash’s bargaining model, a bargaining solution is defined as a function that assigns to
each bargaining game a point in the feasible set of the game. However, we do not have such
a simple definition because in our model the set of possible agreements (feasible set) is not
given in a bargaining game. We have to generate the feasible set from the demand sets.
This involves a process of conflict resolving.
3.1 Possible Deals
Whenever the demands from two agents conflict, at least one agent has to make a concession
in order to reach an agreement. The simple way of making a concession is to withdraw a
number of demands. In such sense, a possible agreement is a pair of subsets of two players’
original demand sets such that the collection of remaining demands is consistent. Obviously
each player would like to keep as many original demands as possible. In addition, if a player
has to give up a demand, the player typically gives up the one with the lowest priority. This
idea leads to the following definition of possible deals.
Definition 2 Let G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)) be a bargaining game. A deal of G is a pair
(D1, D2) satisfying the following conditions: for each i = 1, 2,
1. Di ⊆ Xi;
2. X1 ∩X2 ⊆ Di;
3. for each k (k = 1, 2, · · ·), Di∩Xki is a maximal subset of Xki such that
k⋃
j=1
(Di∩Xji )∪
D−i is consistent.
where {Xji }+∞j=1 is the hierarchy of Xi defined in Section 2.3. The set of all deals of G is
denoted by Ω(G), called the feasible set of the game.
This definition is obviously an analogue of Nebel’s notion ⇓ (see Section 2.4). The only
difference is that the procedure of maximization here is interactive between two agents:
given one player’s demands, the other player always tops up his demands with the highest
prioritized items provided the overall outcome is consistent.
Since we have assumed that both X1 and X2 are consistent, Ω(G) is non-empty. Specif-
ically, if X1 ∪X2 is consistent, we have Ω(G) = {(X1, X2)}.
Example 3 Consider the bargaining game in Example 2. According to the preference or-
derings of the couple, the game has three possible deals:
D1 = ({¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l, c, d}, {¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l, k,¬l}).
D2 = ({¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l, c}, {¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l, o, k}).
D3 = ({¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l}, {¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l, o, k,¬l}).
Therefore Ω(G) = {D1, D2, D3}.
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3.2 The Core of Agreement
We have shown how to generate possible deals, which form the set of possible agreements,
i.e., the feasible set, by resolving conflicting demands. Now we are at the same level as the
game-theoretic model that, to define a bargaining solution, we only have to select a deal
from all possible deals. Obviously, if the demands from two parties contradict, there are
multiple possible deals. Different deals would be in favor of different parties. For instance,
in Figure 2, the deal D′ is in favor of player 1 while D′′ is in favor of player 2. Therefore,
the conflicts in choosing outcomes still exist. The major concern of a bargaining theory is
how to measure and balance the gain of each negotiating party.
X11
...
Xk−11
Xk1
Xk+11
...
X12
...
Xk−12
Xk2
Xk+12
...
D′³1
D′′PPi
Figure 2: Different deals are in favor of different players.
Instead of counting the number of demands that each party can remain from a deal, we
consider the top block demands that a player keeps in the deal (the top levels of demands
in each player’s demand hierarchy) and ignore all the demands that are not included in the
top blocks for the purpose of measuring players’ gains.
Given a deal D, we shall use the maximal number of the top levels of demands in the
deal as the indicator of each player’s gain from the deal, i.e., max{k : X≤ki ⊆ Di} for
i = 1, 2. For instance, in Figure 2, player 1 remains maximally the top k − 1 levels of her
demands from the deal D′′ while player 2 can successfully gain the top k + 1 levels of his
demands from the same deal. With deal D′, both players can remain the top k levels of
demands.
In order to compare different deals, we refer the gain index of a deal to the gain of the
player whoever receives less from the deal, i.e., min{max{k : X≤k1 ⊆ D1},max{k : X≤k2 ⊆
D2}}, or equivalently, max{k : X≤k1 ⊆ D1 and X≤k2 ⊆ D2}. For instance, in Figure 2, the
gain index of D′ is k while the gain index of D′′ is k − 1. Therefore we can say that D′
is better than D′′ because, with D′, both players can remind at least top k blocks in their
demand hierarchies but D′′ can’t.
Formally, let
piGmax = max
(D1,D2)∈Ω(G)
{k : X≤k1 ⊆ D1 and X≤k2 ⊆ D2} (1)
and
γ(G) = {(D1, D2) ∈ Ω(G) : X≤pi
G
max
1 ⊆ D1 & X≤pi
G
max
2 ⊆ D2} (2)
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Then γ(G) collects all the “best deals” from all the possible deals of G. This is because none
of other deals can contain more than the top piGmax levels of demands from both players.
Note that piGmax may be infinite when X1 ∪X2 is consistent. Let
(Φ1,Φ2) = (X
≤piGmax
1 , X
≤piGmax
2 ) (3)
We call Φ = (Φ1,Φ2) the core of the game. Therefore the core contains the top block
demands that all the best deals contain, therefore should be included in the final agreement.
The following lemma gives another way to calculate the core of a game.
Lemma 2 piGmax = max{k : X≤k1 ∪X≤k2 ∪ (X1 ∩X2) is consistent}.
Proof: Let pi = max{k : X≤k1 ∪ X≤k2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2) is consistent}. It is easy to show
that X≤pi
G
max
1 ∪ X≤pi
G
max
2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2) is consistent because γ(G) is non-empty. Therefore
piGmax ≤ pi. On the other hand, since X≤pi1 ∪ X≤pi2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2) is consistent, there exists
a deal (D1, D2) ∈ Ω(G) such that X≤pii ⊆ Di and X1 ∩ X2 ⊆ Di for each i = 1, 2. Thus
pi ≤ piGmax. We conclude that pi = piGmax. ¶
3.3 The Solution
At first sight, a bargaining solution can be easily defined as a function that assigns each
bargaining game G a possible deal in Ω(G). More likely, the solution could select one of
the “best deals” from γ(G). However, due to the multiplicity of γ(G) (see Figure 3), such a
selection is not always feasible if we want the solution to be symmetric to each player. To
show the difficulty, let us consider the following example.
Example 4 Consider a bargaining game G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)), described in three propo-
sitional variables p, q and r, where X1 = {{p}, {r}} and X2 = {{q}, {¬r}} (note that the
demand sets are represented in the form of hierarchy where p Â1 r and q Â2 ¬r (see Section
2.3)). It is easy to know that the game has two possible deals, ({p, r}, {q}) and ({p}, {q,¬r}),
which are all in γ(G). However, none of the deals can lead to an impartial solution. A rea-
sonable solution to the problem should be ({p}, {q}), which take the intersection of all the
best deals for each player, respectively.
Base on the above intuitive explanation, we are now ready to present our bargaining
solution.
Definition 3 The bargaining solution is the function F defined as follows, which maps a
bargaining game G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)) to a pair of sets of sentences:
F (G)
def
= (
⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1,
⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D2) (4)
where γ(G) is defined by Equation (2).
For a better understanding of the construction of our solution, we would like to make
the following remarks:
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X11
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piGmax+1
1
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X12
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piGmax
2
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piGmax+1
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D′′P
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Figure 3: Multiplicity of best deals.
1. The solution gives a prediction of bargaining outcome for each game. Given a game
G, Fi(G) represents all the demands the player i can successfully remain at the end
of bargaining. It also means that these demands are accepted by the other player.
Therefore the final agreement of the bargaining can be defined as F1(G) ∪ F2(G)9.
2. Note that Fi(G) ⊆ Xi for each i = 1, 2. Therefore the solution means a compromise
to each player. Both players may make concessions to their demands in order to
reach the agreement. Obviously, if there is no conflict between the players’ original
demands, i.e., X1 ∪ X2 is consistent, no concession is needed, that is, Fi(G) = Xi
(i = 1, 2).
3. The construction of the solution takes a skeptical view in the sense that, for each
player, a demand item is included in the solution only if it belongs to all the “best
deals”. In other words, the solution gives only a cautious prediction of bargaining
outcome. As a result, the solution is not necessarily a deal if there are multiple
elements in γ(G).
4. The solution is unique to each bargaining game. Like the bargaining problem with
non-convex domain, we have to scarify strict Pareto optimality to gain the uniqueness
(this is the reason we take cautious prediction). However, we will show that the
solution is weakly Pareto optimal (see Section 5.2 for more discussions).
5. In our bargaining model, we do not specify disagreement points. In fact, we assume
that if the solution gives an empty agreement, i.e., F (G) = (∅, ∅), then the negotiation
reaches a disagreement. In other words, (∅, ∅) is the default disagreement point for
any bargaining game.
Example 5 Continue on Example 3. According to the hierarchies of the demand sets shown
in Example 2, the core of the game is:
({¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l, c}, {¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l, o})
9. Alternatively, we can define the final agreement as Cn(F1(G) ∪ F2(G)) if we consider that the outcome
of the negotiation contains all the logical consequences of the demands in the agreement. In addition,
the relation of the items in the agreement should be read as “and” rather than “or”. In other words, all
items in the agreement are accepted by all players.
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Therefore γ(G) contains only a single deal, which is D2 (see Example 3). The solution is
then
F (G) = D2 = ({¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l, c}, {¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l, o, k})
In words, the couple agree upon the commonsense that they can only have one holiday and
they have to get a loan if they want to buy a new car and to go overseas for holiday. The
husband accepts his wife’s suggestion to have holiday in Europe and the wife agrees on buying
a new car.
Now consider the following preference orderings:
¬(d ∧ o) ≈1 (c ∧ o)→ l Â1 d Â1 c
¬(d ∧ o) ≈2 (c ∧ o)→ l Â2 o Â2 k Â2 ¬l
Therefore the demand hierarchies become:
X1 = {{¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l}, {d}, {c}}.
X2 = {{¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o)→ l}, {o}, {k}, {¬l}}.
Let G′ denote the game. The deals are the same as the original hierarchy as shown
in Example 3. However the solution of the game becomes ({¬(d ∧ o), (c ∧ o) → l}, {¬(d ∧
o), (c∧ o)→ l, k}) because piG′max = 2 and all three deals are included in γ(G′). Note that the
final agreement does not include the demands which lead to conflicting (d, o, ¬l) but keeps
the demands which do not lead to conflicting (k). In other words, the solution excludes the
demands that lead to a conflict but keeps the demands that are not involved in any conflicts
even though they are in low priorities.
4. Logical Properties of the Bargaining Solution
In the following two sections, we discuss the properties of the bargaining solution intro-
duced in the previous section. According to Zhang (2007), a bargaining solution satisfies
the axioms Collective Rationality, Scale Invariance, Symmetry and Mutually Comparable
Monotonicity as well as the basic assumptions Individual Rationality, Consistency and Com-
prehensiveness if and only if it is the logical version of Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai &
Smorodinsky, 1975). Among these properties, Collective Rationality, Individual Rationality
and Consistency capture the logical properties of a bargaining solution. Scale Invariance,
Symmetry and Mutually Comparable Monotonicity reflect the game-theoretic properties of
a bargaining solution. Comprehensiveness is an idealized assumption for a logic-based bar-
gaining solution. Although there is a significant difference between the bargaining solution
we defined in this paper and the one in that work, these two solutions share most desirable
properties of bargaining solutions.
4.1 Generic Properties of Logic-Based Bargaining Solutions
It is easy to see that the solution we constructed in the previous section satisfies the following
generic properties of a logic-based bargaining solution.
Theorem 1 For any bargaining game G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)), let F (G) = (F1(G), F2(G)).
Then
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1. F1(G) ⊆ X1 and F2(G) ⊆ X2. (Individual Rationality)
2. F1(G) ∪ F2(G) is consistent. (Consistency)
3. If X1 ∪X2 is consistent, Fi(G) = Xi for all i. (Collective Rationality)
Proof: The proofs for these properties are straightforward from the definition of the bar-
gaining solution (Definition 3). ¶
Note that the logical version of Individual Rationality (IR) has a different meaning
of its game-theoretic version. The logical version of IR means that each player concerns
only her own demands, i.e., whether and how many of her demands are included in the
final agreement. In contrast, the game-theoretic version of IR concerns about whether each
player can gain no less than disagreement point from a negotiation (see more details in
Section 5.1). The other two properties are quite intuitive.
The following example shows that our solution does not satisfy comprehensiveness, which
requires that ϕ ∈ Fi(G) and ψ ºi ϕ implies ψ ∈ Fi(G) for each i (see the work of Zhang,
2007).
Example 6 Consider a bargaining situation in which player 1’s demand set is X1 = {p, q}
and player 2’s demand set is X2 = {¬p, r}, where p, r, q are propositional variables. Assume
that each player ranks her demands in same level (i.e., both demand sets have a singleton
partition). Based on the assumption, it is easy to know that the solution of the game is
({q}, {r}). Therefore, the solution is not comprehensive (for instance, q ¹ p and q ∈ F1(G)
but p 6∈ F1(G)).
Since the solution does not satisfy comprehensiveness, according to Zhang (2007), it is
not the logical version of Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. However, this does not mean that
our solution is less intuitive. Although comprehensiveness is a common restriction in belief
revision and game theory, it is by no means a desirable property of bargaining solution. In
the above example, q and r are not involved in the conflict of the underlying bargaining
game. Thus it is reasonable for the players to keep these irrelevant demands. In addition,
the solution is syntax-dependent. If we represent the demand set as X1 = {p ∧ q} and
X2 = {¬p ∧ r}, the solution will be (∅, ∅).
4.2 Fixed-Point Property
Besides the generic properties, the solution possesses another extraordinary logical property:
the fixed-point property. We consider bargaining or negotiation as mutual persuasion: one
persuades the other to accept her demands. The outcome of negotiation is then the result
of mutual belief revision (Zhang et al., 2004). If it is the case, the negotiation outcome
should satisfy the following fixed-point property.
Theorem 2 For any bargaining game G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)), if X1 and X2 are logically
closed, the bargaining solution F (G) satisfies the following fixed-point condition:
F1(G) + F2(G) = (X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) ∩ (X2 ⊗2 F1(G)) (5)
where ⊗i is the prioritized revision operator for player i (see the definition in Section 2.4).
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Assume that X1 and X2 are two belief sets (so logically closed), representing the belief
states of two agents. Mutual belief revision between the agents means that each agent takes
part of the other agent’s beliefs to revise his belief set. For instance, if Ψ1 is a subset of X1
and Ψ2 is a subset of X2, then X1⊗1Ψ2 is the revised belief set of player 1 after he accepts
player 2’s beliefs Ψ2 while X2 ⊗2 Ψ1 is the resulting belief set of player 2 after accepting
Ψ1. Such an interaction of belief revision can continue until it reaches a fixed point where
the beliefs in common, i.e., (X1⊗1Ψ2)∩ (X2⊗2Ψ1), are exactly the beliefs that the agents
mutually accept, that is, Ψ1 + Ψ2. Note that each agent uses his own way of revision to
rebuilt his belief state. If we view bargaining as mutual belief revision, then the agreement
of bargaining, i.e., F1(G) + F2(G), is exactly the common demands the agents accept each
other, i.e., (X1⊗1 F2(G))∩ (X2⊗2 F1(G)). In other words, the solution F (G) should be the
fixed-point with respect to the game G. The above theorem shows that this can be true if
the demand sets of a game are logically closed.
To show this theorem, we need a few technical lemmas.
Lemma 3 For any bargaining game G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)),
1. F1(G) ⊆ X1 ⊗1 F2(G);
2. F2(G) ⊆ X2 ⊗2 F1(G).
Proof: According to the definition of prioritized base revision, we have X1 ⊗1 F2(G) =⋂
H∈X1⇓F2(G)
Cn(H ∪F2(G)). For any H ∈ X1 ⇓ F2(G), there is a deal (D1, D2) ∈ Ω(G) such
that D1 = H. This is because we can extend the pair (H,F2(G)) to a deal (H,D2) such that
F2(G) ⊆ D2. On the other hand, since Φ1 ∪ F2(G) is consistent, we have Φ1 ⊆ H, where
(Φ1,Φ2) is the core of G. Thus, Φ1 ⊆ D1 and Φ2 ⊆ D2. It follows that (D1, D2) ∈ γ(G).
Since F1(G) ⊆ D1, we have F1(G) ⊆ H. We conclude that F1(G) ⊆ X1 ⊗1 F2(G). The
proof of the second statement is similar. ¶
By this lemma we have,
1. F1(G) + F2(G) ⊆ X1 ⊗1 F2(G);
2. F1(G) + F2(G) ⊆ X2 ⊗2 F1(G).
Note that the above lemma does not require the demand sets X1 and X2 to be logically
closed. However, without the assumption, the following lemmas do not hold.
Lemma 4 Let (Φ1,Φ2) be the core of game G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)). If X1 and X2 are
logically closed, then
1. X1 ⊗1 F2(G) = X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2));
2. X2 ⊗2 F1(G) = X2 ⊗2 (Φ1 + (X1 ∩X2))
Proof: We only present the proof of the first statement. The second one is similar. Firstly,
we prove that F2(G) ⊆ Φ1+Φ2+(X1∩X2). If X1∪X2 is consistent, the result is obviously
true. Therefore we can assume that X1 ∪X2 is inconsistent.
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Assume that ϕ ∈ F2(G). If ϕ 6∈ Φ1+Φ2+(X1∩X2), we have {¬ϕ}∪Φ1∪Φ2∪(X1∩X2) is
consistent. According to Lemma 2, we haveX≤pi
G
max+1
1 ∪X≤pi
G
max+1
2 ∪(X1∩X2) is inconsistent.
Since our language is finite and both X1 and X2 are logically closed, the sets X1 ∩ X2,
X
≤piGmax+1
1 and X
≤piGmax+1
2 are all logically closed (the latter two due to LC). Therefore
each set has a finite axiomatization. Let sentence ψ0 axiomatize X1 ∩ X2, ψ1 axiomatize
X
≤piGmax+1
1 and ψ2 axiomatize X
≤piGmax+1
2 . Thus ψ0 ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 is inconsistent. Notice that
ψ0∧ψ1 ∈ X1 and ψ0∧ψ2 ∈ X2. It follows that ¬ϕ∨(ψ0∧ψ1) ∈ X1 and ¬ϕ∨(ψ0∧ψ2) ∈ X2.
Since {¬ϕ} ∪ Φ1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ (X1 ∩X2) is consistent, there is a deal (D1, D2) ∈ γ(G) such that
{¬ϕ∨(ψ0∧ψ1)}∪Φ1∪(X1∩X2) ⊆ D1 and {¬ϕ∨(ψ0∧ψ2)}∪Φ2∪(X1∩X2) ⊆ D2. We know
that ϕ ∈ F2(G), so ϕ ∈ D1 +D2. Thus ψ0 ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ D1 +D2, which contradicts the fact
that D1 +D2 is consistent. Therefore, we have shown that F2(G) ⊆ Φ1 +Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2).
Now we prove that X1 ⊗1 F2(G) = X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2)). By Lemma 3, we have
Φ1 + Φ2 ⊆ X1 ⊗1 F2(G). It follows that X1 ⊗1 F2(G) = (X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) + (Φ1 + Φ2).
Furthermore, we yield X1 ⊗1 F2(G) = (X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) + (Φ1 + Φ2) + (X1 ∩ X2) because
X1 ∩ X2 ⊆ F2(G). Since F2(G) ⊆ Φ1 + Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2). According to the AGM postu-
lates, we have (X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) + (Φ1 + Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2)) = X1 ⊗1 (Φ1 + Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2)).
Therefore X1 ⊗2 F2(G) = X1 ⊗1 (Φ1 + Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2)). In addition, it is easy to
prove that Φ1 ⊆ X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2)). By the AGM postulates again, we have
X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2)) = (X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2)) + Φ1 = X1 ⊗1 (Φ1 +Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2)).
Therefore X1 ⊗1 F2(G) = X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2)). ¶
The following lemma will complete the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 5 If X1 and X2 are logically closed, then
(X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) ∩ (X2 ⊗2 F1(G)) ⊆ F1(G) + F2(G).
Proof: Let (Φ1,Φ2) be the core of G. Let
Φ′1 = X
≤pi1max
1 and Φ
′
2 = X
≤pi2max
2
where pi1max = max{k : X≤k1 ∪Φ2∪ (X1∩X2) is consistent} and pi2max = max{k : Φ1∪X≤k2 ∪
(X1 ∩X2) is consistent}.
Note that in the cases when piimax does not exist, we simply assume that it equals to
+∞. We claim that X1 ⊗1 F2(G) = Φ′1 + F2(G) and X2 ⊗2 F1(G) = Φ′2 + F1(G). We shall
provide the proof of the first statement. The second one is similar.
Firstly, according to Lemma 2, Φ1 ⊆ Φ′1. Secondly, by Lemma 4, we have X1⊗1F2(G) =
X1⊗1 (Φ2+(X1∩X2)). Therefore to show X1⊗1F2(G) = Φ′1+F2(G), we only need to prove
that X1⊗1 (Φ2+(X1∩X2)) = Φ′1+Φ2+(X1∩X2). This is because Φ2+(X1∩X2) ⊆ F2(G),
F2(G) ⊆ Φ1 +Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2) and Φ1 ⊆ Φ′1. By the construction of prioritized revision, we
can easily verify that Φ′1 + Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2) ⊆ X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2)). Therefore we only
have to show the other direction, i.e., X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2)) ⊆ Φ′1 +Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2).
If Φ′1 = X1, then X1 ∪ (Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2)) is consistent. It follows that X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 +
(X1 ∩ X2)) ⊆ X1 + (Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2)) = Φ′1 + Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2), as desired. If Φ′1 6= X1,
according to the definition of pi1max, we have X
≤pi1max+1
1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2) is inconsistent.
Therefore there exists ψ ∈ X≤pi1max+11 such that ¬ψ ∈ Φ2+(X1 ∩X2). Now we assume that
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ϕ ∈ X1⊗1 (Φ2+ (X1 ∩X2)). If ϕ 6∈ Φ′1+Φ2+ (X1 ∩X2), then {¬ϕ} ∪Φ′1 ∪Φ2 ∪ (X1 ∩X2)
is consistent. So is {¬ϕ ∨ ψ} ∪ Φ′1 ∪ Φ2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2). Notice that ¬ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ X≤pi
1
max+1
1 .
There exists H ∈ X1 ⇓ (Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2)) such that {¬ϕ ∨ ψ} ∪ Φ′1 ⊆ H. Since ϕ ∈
X1 ⊗1 (Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2)) and H is logically closed, we have ψ ∈ H, which contradicts the
consistency of H∪(Φ2+(X1∩X2)). Therefore X1⊗1 (Φ2+(X1∩X2)) ⊆ Φ′1+Φ2+(X1∩X2).
Finally we prove the claim of the lemma. Let ϕ ∈ (X1 ⊗1 F2(G)) ∩ (X2 ⊗2 F1(G)).
We then have ϕ ∈ (Φ′1 + F2(G)) ∩ (Φ′1 + F2(G)). For ϕ ∈ Φ′1 + F2(G), there exists a sen-
tence ψ2 such that F2(G) ` ψ2 and ϕ ∨ ¬ψ2 ∈ Φ′1. Similarly, there exists a sentence ψ1
such that F1(G) ` ψ1 and ϕ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∈ Φ′2. It turns out that ϕ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ ¬ψ2 ∈ Φ′1 ∩ Φ′2.
Thus ϕ ∨ ¬ψ1 ∨ ¬ψ2 ∈ X1 ∩ X2. However, X1 ∩ X2 ⊆ F1(G) + F2(G). It follows that
ϕ∨¬ψ1∨¬ψ2 ∈ F1(G)+F2(G). Note that ψ1∧ψ2 ∈ F1(G)+F2(G). Therefore we conclude
that ϕ ∈ F1(G) + F2(G). ¶
Theorem 2 establishes the link between bargaining theory and belief revision. The link
helps us to understand the reasoning process behind bargaining. It is even more interesting
if we can extend the result into the general multiagent case. However, the main challenge
is how multiple agents mutually revise their beliefs.
5. Game-theoretic Properties of the Bargaining Solution
In game theory, the properties that are considered to be important to a bargaining solution
include individual rationality, Pareto optimality, ordinal invariance (or scale invariance),
symmetry and contraction independence. In our bargaining model, bargainers’ preferences
are represented in total preorder, any order-preserving transformation on the preferences
does not change the order of preferences. Therefore our solution satisfies ordinal invariance
trivially. In this section, we will examine the other properties in the above list with our
bargaining solution. Before presenting the results, we first introduce a few concepts that
are necessary for the game-theoretic analysis of bargaining.
5.1 Strategies and Utilities
Two concepts play essential roles in game-theoretic analysis of bargaining: strategy and
utility. Given a bargaining game G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)), a strategy profile of the game is
a pair (S1, S2) where S1 ⊆ X1 and S2 ⊆ X2. The strategy profile can be interpreted as a
pair of proposals of demands from both players in a course of bargaining.
We say a strategy profile S = (S1, S2) to be compatible if
1. X1 ∩X2 ⊆ S1 and X1 ∩X2 ⊆ S2
2. S1 ∪ S2 is consistent
Obviously any deal of a game is a compatible strategy profile. The bargaining solution
F (G) is also a compatible strategy profile of G.
Now we consider the gains of each player from a strategy profile. Assume that the
strategy profile (S1, S2) leads to an agreement, the player i’s payoff or utility is defined as:
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ui(Si) =
{
max{k : X≤ki ⊆ Si}, if Si 6= Xi;
min{k : X≤ki = Xi}, otherwise.
In other words, ui(S) counts the number of top block demands that are covered by Si.
Note that the payoff does not count individual demands. Specifically we define the utility
for the default disagreement point (∅, ∅) to be (0, 0).
5.2 Pareto Optimality
Based on the above definition, it is easy to see that our solution satisfies individual ratio-
nality (in the sense of game theory) because for any game G, ui(Fi(G)) ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2.
Now we consider Pareto efficiency.
Pareto optimality is one of the most important properties of bargaining solution. We
call a compatible strategy profile (S1, S2) of a game to be (strictly) Pareto optimal if there
does not exist a compatible strategy profile (S′1, S′2) of the game such that either u1(S′1) ≥
u1(S1) & u2(S′2) > u2(S2) or u1(S′1) > u1(S1) & u2(S′2) ≥ u2(S2).
A compatible strategy profile (S1, S2) of a game is weakly Pareto optimal if there does
not exist another compatible strategy profile (S′1, S′2) of the game such that u1(S′1) > u1(S1)
and u2(S′2) > u2(S2).
Theorem 3 For any bargaining game G, F (G) is weakly Pareto optimal.
Proof: Suppose that there is a compatible strategy profile (S1, S2) of G such that u1(S1) >
u1(F1(G)) and u2(S2) > u2(F2(G)). Then u1(S1) > piGmax and u2(S2) > pi
G
max. Since
(S1, S2) is compatible, X
≤u1(S1)
1 ∪ X≤u2(S2)2 ∪ (X1 ∩ X2) is consistent. It turns out that
max{k : Xk1 ∪Xk2 ∪ (X1∩X2) is consistent} > piGmax, which contradicts Lemma 2. Therefore
F (G) is weakly Pareto optimal. ¶
Obviously, our solution F does not satisfy strict Pareto optimality. For instance, the
solution of G′ in Example 5 (the second part of the example) is not strictly Pareto optimal
(but it is weakly Pareto optimal). This is not a problem of the solution but the nature of
the problem domain we consider. It is well known in game theory that if the feasible set of
a bargaining game is not convex, there is no guarantee of unique bargaining solution that is
strictly Pareto optimal (Kaneko, 1980; Mariotti, 1996). Therefore, for non-convex domain,
we need a trade-off between the uniqueness of solutions and strict Pareto optimality (Conley
& Wilkie, 1991, 1996; Mariotti, 1998; Xu & Yoshihara, 2006). By using a similar approach
introduced by Zhang (2007), we can map a logically represented bargaining game into a
numerically represented bargaining game. Under such a mapping, the feasible set that
corresponds to any logically represented bargaining game is non-convex unless the demand
sets of the logical bargaining game is consistent. Since our solution is a unique solution, we
cannot expect it to be strictly Pareto optimal.
5.3 Restricted Symmetry
In game theory, a bargaining game is symmetric if the feasible set is invariant under any
permutation of each point in the feasible set (Nash, 1950). However, the concept of sym-
metry is not easy to be extended to the logic-based bargaining models because a bargaining
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problem is represented by its physical items. Permutation of deals does not make any sense.
One may wonder how to judge the fairness of bargaining without the concept of symmetry.
In our point of view, there is no such a thing as fair outcome in negotiation. The outcome
of a negotiation relies on the bargaining power of each party. A bargainer with higher
negotiation power receives more gains from the negotiation. However, it is reasonable to
assume that any negotiation should be based on a fair bargaining procedure or a negotiation
protocol. The construction of our bargaining solution is meant to capture the idea of fair
negotiation protocols. The approach we use in this paper is similar to the idea of bargaining
with an agenda (O’Neill et al., 2004). We consider a negotiation process consists of several
rounds or stages. At each round, the parties are to reach agreements on new issues that
have not been considered in the previous rounds. We assume that each party always place
the higher wanted demands at earlier rounds. All the demands that have been mutually
accepted in the earlier rounds have to remain in the agreements of the negotiation in the
later rounds. Once there is no new agreement being reached, the negotiation procedure
stops. With such a process, a negotiation always terminates at the same level of priority of
demands for all players.
Theorem 4 For any bargaining game G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)), if X1 and X2 are logically
closed, then there is a natural number n such that
F(G) = (X1 ∩ (X≤n1 +X≤n2 + (X1 ∩X2)), X2 ∩ (X≤n1 +X≤n2 + (X1 ∩X2)))
Proof: In fact, we can prove that n = piGmax. In such a case X
≤n
1 +X
≤n
2 = Φ1 +Φ2.
Obviously if X1 ∪X2 is consistent, then the result is trivial. Therefore we assume that
X1 ∪X2 is inconsistent. We only prove the case that F1(G) = X1 ∩ (Φ1 +Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2)).
The proof of the other part is similar.
For any (D1, D2) ∈ γ(G), we have Φ1 ⊆ D1 and Φ2 ⊆ D2. We prove that X1∩(Φ1+Φ2+
(X1∩X2)) ⊆ D1. If it is not the case, there exists a sentence ϕ ∈ X1∩(Φ1+Φ2+(X1∩X2))
such that ϕ 6∈ D1. On the one hand, ϕ ∈ X1∩(Φ1+Φ2+(X1∩X2)) implies that D1∪D2 ` ϕ
because Φ1 + Φ2 + (X1 ∩ X2) ⊆ D1 + D2. On the other hand, ϕ 6∈ D1 implies that
{ϕ}∪D1 ∪D2 is inconsistent due to the maximality of deals. It follows that D1 ∪D2 ` ¬ϕ.
Therefore D1 ∪ D2 is inconsistent, a contradiction. We have proved that for any deal
(D1, D2) ∈ γ(G), X1 ∩ (Φ1 + Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2)) ⊆ D1. Thus X1 ∩ (Φ1 + Φ2 + (X1 ∩X2)) ⊆⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1 = F1(G). The proof of Lemma 4 has shown that the other direction of inclu-
sion F1(G) ⊆ X1∩(Φ1+Φ2+(X1∩X2)) holds. Therefore F1(G) = X1∩(Φ1+Φ2+(X1∩X2)).
¶
This theorem shows that at the termination of negotiation, each party can remain the
demands down to the same level, i.e., piGmax, including the common demands and their
logical consequences. However, the solution seemingly excludes the low ranked irrelevant
items. This is due to the assumption of the logical closedness on the demand sets. In fact,
with this assumption, no items are irrelevant because for any two statements ϕ,ψ ∈ Xi, we
always have ϕ → ψ and ψ → ϕ in Xi. This is why we do not assume logical closedness in
general.
Another question that may arise is that a player could gain more negotiation power
than the other if he puts more negotiation items in earlier stages of his agenda (effectively
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could gain more if the negotiation does not end up with disagreement). In fact, this is true
and natural if the risk of breakdown is taken into account. If a player places a conflictive
item in an earlier stage in his agenda, the negotiation would terminate sooner. Therefore
the ordering of demands is a part of the strategy of a bargainer. We will discuss this issue
in a separate section (see Section 6)
5.4 Contraction Independence
Contraction Independence, or called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), requires
that if an alternative is judged to be the best compromise for some problem, then it should
still be judged best for any subproblem that contains it (Thomson, 1994). For logic-based
bargaining model, alternatives are not explicitly given. However, we can easily define the
concept of subproblem in terms of bargainers’ prioritized demand sets.
A bargaining game G′ = ((X ′1,º′1), (X ′2,º′2)) is a subgame of G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)),
denoted by G′ v G, if for any i = 1, 2,
1. X ′i ⊆ Xi,
2. º′i=ºi ∩(X ′i ×X ′i),
3. for any ϕ ∈ Xi, if there is ψ ∈ X ′i and ϕ º ψ, then ϕ ∈ X ′i.
In other words, X ′i is the upper segment of Xi with respect to Xi’s hierarchy.
Theorem 5 Let G′ v G. If F (G) is a strategy profile of G′, then F (G′) = F (G).
Proof: First, since F (G) is a strategy profile of G′, we have X1 ∩ X2 ⊆ X ′i (i = 1, 2).
According to the definition of subgame, it is easy to show that piG
′
max ≤ piGmax. By the
condition that F (G) is a strategy profile of G′ again, we have piG′max = piGmax, which means
that G′ and G share the same core (Φ1,Φ2). For each deal (D1, D2) ∈ γ(G), obviously
(D1 ∩ X ′1, D2 ∩ X ′2) is a deal of G′ and (D1 ∩ X ′1, D2 ∩ X ′2) ∈ γ(G′). It follows that
F1(G′) ⊆ D1 and F2(G′) ⊆ D2. Therefore F1(G′) ⊆ F1(G) and F2(G′) ⊆ F2(G).
On the other hand, for each (D′1, D′2) ∈ γ(G′), we can extend it into a deal (D1, D2) of
G such that (D1, D2) ∈ γ(G) because G′ and G share the same core and X1 ∩ X2 ⊆ X ′i
(i = 1, 2). Since F (G) is a strategy profile of G′, we have F1(G) ⊆ D1 ∩X ′1 and F2(G) ⊆
D2 ∩X ′2. It follows that F1(G) ⊆ D′1 and F2(G) ⊆ D′2, which implies F1(G) ⊆ F1(G′) and
F2(G) ⊆ F2(G′). We conclude that F (G′) = F (G). ¶
Note that the claim of the above theorem is weaker than Nash’s IIA because, for any
two bargaining games G and G′, the alternatives of G′ being a subset of the alternatives of
G do not guarantee G′ is a subgame of G. However, as it has been pointed out by many
authors, Nash’s IIA in his original form is no longer a plausible assumption for the domain
of non-convex bargaining problems (Conley & Wilkie, 1996; Mariotti, 1998; Zhang, 2007).
6. Bargaining Power and Risk Posture
As we have shown in Section 1, representing bargainers’ preferences in ordinal does not
automatically solve the problem of ordinal bargaining (see Example 1). This is because
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ordinal preference has much less expressive power than cardinal utility. It is unable to ex-
press risk posture of a player, which determines the player’s bargaining power. A successful
solution to the ordinal bargaining problem should supply an alternative mean to express
bargainers’ attitude towards risk. In this section, we will illustrate with two case studies
how this problem is solved using our framework.
6.1 Case Study I: Bargainer’s Attitude towards Risk
Let us revisit the bargaining game in Example 4, where the demand sets areX1 = {p, r} and
X2 = {q,¬r}. Consider the following variations of preferences, which reflect the difference
of players’ attitude towards risk (note that different cases lead to different games).
G1 : X1 = {{p}, {r}} and X2 = {{q}, {¬r}}10
G2 : X2 = {{p, r}, {}} and X2 = {{q}, {¬r}}
G3 : X3 = {{p}, {r}} and X2 = {{q,¬r}, {}}
G4 : X4 = {{p, r}} and X2 = {{q,¬r}}
It is easy to calculate the solutions of the games:
F (G1) = ({p}, {q})
F (G2) = ({p, r}, {q})
F (G3) = ({p}, {q,¬r})
F (G4) = (∅, ∅)
In G1, both players are risk-averse, where the players rank the conflicting item r being
the lowest priority. This means that both have the incentive to reach an agreement. In
G2, player 1 is more aggressive since the conflicting item is highly ranked. We find that
player 1 won the game in this case. This is not surprising. In general, a risk-averse player
would gain disadvantage in negotiation comparing to a risk-lover (see Roth’s book, 1979b,
p.35-60). G3 is symmetrical to G2. In G4, both players are aggressive, therefore the game
ends up with disagreement.
From the example, it is clear to see how bargainers’ attitude towards risk are specified
in our model. A risk-averse player would give the demands that likely conflict with the
demands of the other player relatively lower priorities so that an agreement is more likely
to be reached. In contrast, a risk-loving player would more firmly entrench those conflicting
demands. Notice that logic plays a crucial role in the representation. Simply expressing
bargainers’ demands in physical terms without specifying their relation is not sufficient to
lead to an ordinal solution. It is crucial to specify the logical relations between the demands
from all players. In the above example, the contradiction demands r and ¬r play the main
role in the determination of the solutions. This is the main difference of our model from
the game-theoretic models.
6.2 Case Study II: Discretization of Numerical Games
As we have mentioned in the introduction section, risk posture is represented in non-linearity
of utility functions in Nash’s model. In this subsection, we use the example of cake division
(Example 1) to show how the non-linearity of preferences is represented in our model.
10. The demand sets are represented in prioritized partitions. Their corresponding preference orderings are
p º1 r and q º2 ¬r, respectively.
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To represent the bargaining problem in logical form, we need to discretize the domain.
Let pn = {Player A receives no less than n percentages of the cake and player B gets
the remain}, where n is a natural number between 0 to 100. In addition, the following
constraints should be acknowledged by both players:
C = {pn+1 → pn : n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 100}
which says that if player 1 receives no less than n + 1 percents of the cake, then he must
receive no less than n percents.
Then the demands of two players can be represented as
XA = C ∪ {p0, p1, p1, · · · , p100}
XB = C ∪ {¬p101,¬p100,¬p99, · · · ,¬p1}
Assume that player A arranges his demands according to the linear scale of his share.
The hierarch of his demand set is11:
{C, {p0 · · · , p5}, {p6 · · · , p10}, · · · , {p96, · · · , p100}}
Player B arranges his demands according to the square of his share. The hierarch of her
demand set is12:
{C, {¬p101, · · · ,¬p79}, {¬p78, · · · ,¬p70}, · · · , {¬p6,¬p5,¬p4}, {¬p3,¬p2}, {¬p1}}
According to the above setting, the solution of the bargaining game is:
(C ∪ {p34, p33, · · · , p0}, C ∪ {¬p42,¬p43, · · · ,¬p101})
It is easy to calculate that the players agree on the division of the cake to be 34 ≤ xA < 42
and 58 < xB ≤ 66.13 Therefore our solution gives similar prediction as the game-theoretic
solutions. This indicates that the risk posture of the players has been embedded in our
model. In fact, we can easily see that player B is more aggressive because he ranks higher
conflicting items relatively higher than player A does. For instance, player B ranks the
equal share (50/50) at the 7th level while player A ranks it at 11th level.
As we have seen again from the example, the ordering of demands does not reflect
player’s gains from the demands but represents the player’s preference of retaining or aban-
doning his demands. This is another significant difference between our bargaining model
and the game-theoretic models.
One may ask that whether a player could get advantages by “cheating” in the sense
that if an agent knows the demands and ranking of the other party, the agent can adjust
her demand hierarchy in order to obtain a better outcome. Yes, it is possible. You can tell
your opposite what you want (your demands) but you should not release your ranking on
your demands. Otherwise, you lose your bargaining power. The reason is that your attitude
towards risk has been encoded in your ranking on your demands.
11. This indicates that player A ignores small differences of divisions. For instance, he may consider that
any share between 0-5% means the same to him. In the real negotiation, the player may request 100%,
95%, · · · 5% in sequence by giving up 5% at each round in a bargaining.
12. Player B claims his share in the sequence 100%, 98%, 95%, · · · by dropping his demand in the scale of
square.
13. Note that there is no communication between the players. Therefore a player may give up more then it
is needed (similar to sealed-bid auction).
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7. Computational Complexity
In this section, we study the computational properties of the bargaining solution we de-
veloped earlier. We assume that readers are familiar with the complexity classes of P,
NP, coNP, ΣP2 and Π
P
2 = coΣ
P
2 . The class of DP contains all languages L such that
L = L1 ∩ L2 where L1 is in NP and L2 is in coNP. Also the class ∆Pk+1 = PΣ
P
k contains
all languages recognizable in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine with a
ΣPk oracle. In particular, the class ∆
P
2 [O(logn)] contains all languages recognizable by a
deterministic Turing machine with O(logn) calls to an NP oracle14 and ∆P3 contains all lan-
guages recognisable by a deterministic Turing machine with a ΣP2 oracle. It is well known
that P ⊆ NP ⊆ DP ⊆ ∆P2 ⊆ ΣP2 ⊆ ∆P3 , and these inclusions are generally believed to be
proper (readers may refer to the work of Papadimitriou, 1994, for further details).
Consider a bargaining game G = ((X1,º1), (X2,º2)) where X1 and X2 are finite. As we
have mentioned in Section 2.3, we can always write Xi = X1i ∪· · ·∪Xmi , where Xki ∩X li = ∅
for any k 6= l. Also for each k < m, if a formula ϕ ∈ Xki , then there does not exist a
ψ ∈ X li (k < l) such that ϕ ≺i ψ. Therefore, for the convenience of analysis, in the rest
of this section, we will specify a bargaining game as G = (X1, X2), where X1 =
m⋃
i=1
Xi1 and
X2 =
n⋃
j=1
Xj2 , and X
1
1 , · · ·, Xm1 , and X12 , · · ·, Xn2 are the partitions of X1 and X2 respectively
and satisfy the properties mentioned above.
The following four major decision problems are most important in order to understand
the computational properties for our bargaining game model developed in the previous
sections: let G = (X1, X2) be a bargaining game, we would like to decide: (1) whether a
given pair (D1, D1) where Di ⊆ Xi (i = 1, 2) is a deal of G; (2) whether a given pair of
propositional formulas (Φ1,Φ2) is a core of G respectively; (3) whether a given formula is
derivable from the core of G; and (4) whether a given strategy profile of G is a solution of
G, First, we have the following result for deciding a deal for a given bargaining game.
Theorem 6 Let G = (X1, X2) be a bargaining game, and D1 ⊆ X1 and D2 ⊆ X2. Deciding
whether (D1, D2) is a deal of G is DP-complete.
Proof: Membership proof. According to Definition 2, to decide whether (D1, D2) is a deal
of G, for D1 (or D2), we need to check: (1) for each k = 1, · · · ,m (or for k′ = 1, · · · , n resp.),
whether D2∪
k⋃
j=1
(D1∩Xj1) (or D1∪
k′⋃
j=1
(D2∩Xj2) resp.) is consistent; (2) checking whether
X1 ∩X2 ⊆ Di (i = 1, 2); and (3) such D1 and D2 are maximal such subsets of X1 and X2
respectively. For (1), we observe that for each k, the set
⋃k
j=1(D1∩Xj1) can be computed in
polynomial time, and checking the consistency of D2 ∪
k⋃
j=1
(D1 ∩Xj1) is in NP. The same for
D2 case. It is obvious to see that (2) can be done in polynomial time. Now we consider (3).
In order to check whether D1 and D2 are the maximal subsets of X1 and X2 respectively
satisfying the condition, we consider the complement the problem: assume that D1 (we
can also assume D2) is not the maximal subset of X1 satisfying the required conditions,
14. Note that in literatures, different notions have been used to denote this complexity class such as PNP [logn],
PNP|| and Θ
P
2 .
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then there exists some k and some ϕ ∈ (X1 \D1) such that D2 ∪
k⋃
j=1
((D1 ∪ {ϕ}) ∩Xk1 ) is
consistent. Clearly, we can guess such k, formula ϕ and an interpretation S, then check
whether S is a model of D2∪
k⋃
j=1
((D1∪{ϕ})∩Xk1 ). Obviously, this is in NP. So the original
problem is in coNP.
Hardness proof. It is known that for given propositional formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2, decid-
ing whether ϕ1 is satisfiable and ϕ2 is unsatisfiable is DP-complete (Papadimitriou, 1994).
Given two propositional formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2, we construct in polynomial time a transfor-
mation from the ϕ1’s satisfiability and ϕ2’s unsatisfiability to a deal decision problem of
a game. We simply define a game G = (X1, X2) = ({¬ϕ2 → ϕ1 ∧ p}, {q} ∪ {¬p}), where
p, q are propositional atoms not occurring in ϕ1 and ϕ2. Note that X1 ∩ X2 = ∅. Let
D1 = X1 and D2 = {q}. Now we show that (D1, D2) is a deal of G, that is, D2 are the
maximal subset of X2 such that X1 ∪D2 is consistent, if and only if ϕ1 is satisfiable and ϕ2
is unsatisfiable.
(⇒) Clearly, if ϕ1 is satisfiable and ϕ2 is unsatisfiable, then X1 ∪ D2 is consistent, but
X1 ∪X2 is not consistent. So (D1, D2) is a deal of G.
(⇐) Suppose ϕ1 and ϕ2 are unsatisfiable. Then X1 itself is not consistent. If both ϕ1 and
ϕ2 are satisfiable, then it is observed that X1 ∪X2 is consistent. So (D1, D2) is not a deal
of G. Finally, suppose ϕ1 is unsatisfiable and ϕ2 is satisfiable. In this case, X1 ∪X2 is still
consistent. That means, (D1, D2) is not a deal of G either. ¶
As we can see from the definition, the core of a bargaining plays an essential role in
the construction of the bargaining solution. The following theorem provides the complexity
result of its decision problem.
Theorem 7 Let G a bargaining game. Deciding whether a given pair of sets of propositional
formulas (Φ1,Φ2) is the core of G is DP-complete.
Proof: Membership proof. Let G = (X1, X2), where X1 =
⋃
Xi1, and X1 =
⋃
Xj1 . We
outline an algorithm to check whether (Φ1,Φ2) is the core of G: (1) check whether for some
k, Φ1 =
k⋃
i=1
Xi1 and Φ2 =
k⋃
i=1
Xi2, and Φ1 6=
k+1⋃
i=1
Xi1 or Φ2 6=
k+1⋃
i=1
Xi2; (2) check whether
Φ1 ∪Φ2 is consistent; and (3) check if Φ1 ∪Xk+11 ∪Φ2 ∪Xk+12 is not consistent. Clearly, (1)
can be done in polynomial time, checking (2) is in NP and checking (3) is in coNP. So the
problem is in DP.
Hardness proof. The hardness proof is similar to that as described in the proof of
Theorem 7 with some variations. Given two propositional formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2, we reduce
the decision problem of ϕ1’s satisfiability and ϕ2’s unsatisfiability to our problem. Let
G = (X1, X2), where X1 = {¬ϕ2 → ϕ1 ∧ p} ∪ {q}, and X2 = {q} ∪ {¬p}, where p, q are
propositional atoms not occurring in ϕ1 and ϕ2. We specify a pair of sets of formulas:
(Φ1,Φ2) = ({¬ϕ2 → ϕ1 ∧ p}, {q}).
Now we show that (Φ1,Φ2) is the core of G if and only if ϕ1 is satisfiable and ϕ2 is
unsatisfiable. Suppose that ϕ1 is satisfiable and ϕ2 is unsatifiable. Then Φ1∪Φ = {ϕ1∧p, q},
which is consistent. On the other hand, Φ1 ∪ {q} ∪ Φ2 ∪ {¬p} = {ϕ1 ∧ p, q,¬p}, which is
not consistent. So (Φ1,Φ2) is the core of G.
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We prove the other direction. (1) Both ϕ1 and ϕ2 are satisfiable. Then Φ1 ∪ Φ2 =
{(ϕ2∨ϕ1)∧(ϕ2∨p), q}, which is consistent. However, we can also see that Φ1∪{q}∪Φ2∪{¬p}
has at leat one model which satisfies ϕ2, q and ¬p. This implies that (Φ1,Φ2) is no longer
the core of G. (2) Both ϕ1 and ϕ2 are unsatisfiable. In this case, Φ1 ∪ Φ2 is not consistent
any more. So (Φ1,Φ2) is not the core of G. (3) ϕ1 is unsatisfiable and ϕ2 is satisfiable.
Again, under this situation, Φ1 ∪Φ2 is no longer consistent, and hence it is not the core of
G. This completes our proof. ¶
Recall that the intuition behind the core is that the final agreement maximizes fairly
each agent’s demands without violating the overall consistency. Then it is interesting to
know whether certain information is derivable from the agent’s demands that are in the
final agreement. Let Φ = (Φ1,Φ2) is the core of bargaining game G. We define C(G) ` ϕ
if and only if Φ1 ` ϕ or Φ2 ` ϕ.
Theorem 8 Given a bargaining game G and a propositional formula ϕ. Deciding whether
C(G) ` ϕ is ∆P2 [O(logn)]-complete.
Proof: Membership proof. We outline an algorithm of deciding C(G) ` ϕ as follows: (1)
compute the core (Φ1,Φ2) of G, and (2) checking if Φ1 ` ϕ or Φ2 ` ϕ. From the definition,
Φ = (Φ1,Φ2) is the core of G iff Φ1 =
k⋃
j=1
Xj1 , and Φ2 =
k⋃
j=2
Xj1 , where k is the maximal
number that makes Φ1∪Φ2 consistent. Clearly, such k can be determinated by binay search
with O(logn) NP oracle calls. Then checking Φ1 ` ϕ or Φ2 ` ϕ can be done with two NP
oracle calls. So the problem is in ∆P2 [O(logn)].
Hardness proof. We reduce the ∆P2 [O(logn)]-complete PARITY Bω (Kobler, Schoning,
& Wagner, 1987; Wagner, 1988) to our problem. An instance of PARITY Bω is a set of
propositional formulas ϕ1, · · · , ϕn such that if ϕi is not satisfiable, then for each j ≥ i, ϕj
is not satisfiable. The problem is to decide whether the number of satisfiable formulas is
odd. Without loss of generality, we assume n is an even number. Then we construct in
polynomial time a bargaining game G = (X1, X2) as follows:
X1 =
⋃
X
n/2
1 = {¬ϕ2 → p} ∪ {¬ϕ4 → ϕ3 ∧ p} ∪ · · · {¬ϕn → ϕn−1 ∧ p},
X2 =
⋃
X
n/2
2 = {q1} ∪ {q2} ∪ · · · ∪ {qn/2},
where p, q1, · · · , qn/2 are propositional atoms not occurring in ϕ1, · · · , ϕn. Let ϕ = p. Now we
show that C(G) ` p if and only if there is an odd number of satisfiable formulas in ϕ1, · · · , ϕn.
First, suppose k is an odd number, ϕ1, · · · , ϕk are satisfiable, and ϕk+1, · · · , ϕn are not satis-
fiable. Then it is observed that Φ =
[k/2]⋃
j=1
Xj1 ∪Xj2 = {¬ϕ2 → p,¬ϕ4 → ϕ3 ∧ p, · · · ,¬ϕk+1 →
ϕk ∧ p} ∪ {q1, · · · , q[k/2]} is consistent, and Φ∪ {¬ϕk+3 → ϕk+2 ∧ p} ∪ {q[k/2]+1} is not con-
sistent. So (
[k/2]⋃
j=1
Xj1 ,
[k/2]⋃
j=1
Xj2) is the core of G. Also, since ¬ϕk+1 is not satisfiable, it follows
that ¬ϕk+1 → ϕk ∧ p is reduced to ϕk ∧ p, which is contained in
[k/2]⋃
j=1
Xj1 . So C(G) ` p.
Second, we assume that there is an even number of satisfiable formulas in ϕ1, · · · , ϕn. Let k
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be the even number such that ϕ1, · · · , ϕk are satisfiable and ϕk+1, · · · , ϕn are not satisfiable.
In this case, it can be observed that Φ =
k/2⋃
j=1
Xj1∪Xj2 = {¬ϕ2 → p,¬ϕ4 → ϕ3∧p, · · · ,¬ϕk →
ϕk−1 ∧ p} ∪ {q1, · · · , qk/2} is consistent, while Φ ∪ {¬ϕk+2 → ϕk+1 ∧ p} ∪ {qk/2+1} is not
consistent. So (
k/2⋃
j=1
Xj1 ,
k/2⋃
j=1
Xj2) is the core of G. Then it is obvious that p cannot be derived
from
k/2⋃
j=1
Xj1 . That is, C(G) 6` p. This completes our proof. ¶
Finally, we consider the decision problem for the solution of a given bargaining game.
The following theorem gives its complexity upper bound.
Theorem 9 Let G be a bargaining game,and (S1, S2) a strategy profile of G. Deciding
whether (S1, S2) is the solution of G is in ∆P3 .
Proof: From Definition 3, we need to check whether S1 =
⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1 and S2 =⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D2, where γ(G) = {(D1, D2) ∈ Ω(G) : Φ1 ⊆ D1,Φ2 ⊆ D2}, and (Φ1,Φ2) is
the core of G. Note that for simplicity, here we use the notion of core to represent the
solution.
We first consider the complement of deciding S1 =
⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1: checking whether
S1 6= ⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1. Clearly, S1 6= ⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1 iff (1) S1 6⊆ ⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1; or (2)⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1 6⊆ S1. We first guess a pair of sets of propositional formulas (Φ1,Φ2), and
check if it is the core of G. According to Theorem 8, we know that this is in ΣP2 . Clearly,
(1) holds iff there exists a formula ϕ such that (a) ϕ ∈ S1, and (b) ϕ 6∈ ⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1.
Further, (b) holds iff there exists a deal (D1, D2) such that Φ1 ⊆ D1, Φ2 ⊆ D2 and ϕ 6∈ D1.
Now we guess ϕ and (D1, D2), and then check if ϕ ∈ S1, (D1, D2) is a deal containing the
core, and ϕ 6∈ D1. From Thorem 7 we know that checking (D1, D2) is a deal can be done
with two NP oracle calls. So task (1) can be solved in ΣP2 .
On the other hand, (2) holds iff there exists some ϕ such that ϕ ∈ ⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1
and ϕ 6∈ S1. To solve task (2), we consider its complement: for all ϕ, if ϕ 6∈ S1, then
ϕ 6∈ ⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1. Since there are only |X1| + |X2| formulas we need to check, checking
all ϕ that are not in S1 can be done in linear time. Then for each ϕ 6∈ S1, we need to
check if ϕ 6∈ ⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1, which, as shown above, can be done in ΣP2 . Therefore, for all ϕ
that are not in S1, there are at most |X1|+ |X2| checkings of whether ϕ 6∈ ⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1,
which is in PΣ
P
2 = ∆P3 . This follows that deciding whether S1 =
⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1 is in ∆P3 .
Consequently, the original problem is also in ∆P3 . ¶
From the proof of Theorem 10, it can be observed that the computation for a bargaining
game is very different from that of Nebel’s prioritized belief revision.
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Theorem 10 Let G be a bargaining game and (S1, S2) a strategy profile of G. Deciding
whether (S1, S2) is the solution of G is DP-hard.
Proof: We consider a special game G = (X1, X2) where X1 = X11 ∪X21 , and X2 = X12 (i.e.
X2 has a singleton partition), and X11 ∪X12 is consistent but X1 ∪X2 is not consistent. In
this case, we know that (X11 , X
1
2 ) is the core of G. So our question is reduced to decide
whether S2 = X2, and S1 is the maximal subset of X1 containing X11 such that S1 ∪X2 is
consistent. From the proof of Theorem 3, it is easy to see that this is DP-hard. ¶
Obviously, there is a gap between the lower bound and upper bound for the solution
decision problem. This also sheds a light that our bargaining solution cannot be represented
in terms of the traditional belief revision operators.
Theorem 11 Let G be a bargaining game and (S1, S2) a strategy profile of G. Deciding
whether (S1, S2) is the solution of G is in ∆P2 [O(logn)], given that the set of all deals Ω(G)
is provided.
Proof: To decide whether (S1, S2) is a solution of G, we need to do the following: (1)
compute the core (Φ1,Φ2) of G; (2) compute γ(G) from Ω(G) and (Φ1,Φ2); (3) compute
D′1 =
⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D1 and D′2 =
⋂
(D1,D2)∈γ(G)
D2; and (4) compare whether S1 = D′1 and
S2 = D′2. Task (1) can be solved with one ∆P2 [O(logn)] oracle call; having (Φ1,Φ2), task
(2) can be done in polynomial time; and tasks (3) and (4) can be done in polynomial time.
So the problem is in ∆P2 [O(logn)]. ¶
8. Related Work
The investigation of ordinal bargaining theory diverges in two directions. The first direction
focuses on the existence of ordinal solution in the Nash bargaining model. As we have
mentioned in the introduction section, Shapley, Kibris, Safra and Samet have shown that
there is a solution to the bargaining problems with three agents or more, which satisfies
ordinal invariance, symmetry and Pareto optimality (Shubik, 1982; O¨zgu¨r Kibris, 2004;
Safra & Samet, 2004). This result is interesting because it shows a difference between
bilateral bargaining and multilateral bargaining. However, it does not solve the problem
of ordinal bargaining because the solution is not constructive and, more importantly, no
alternative mean is offered to facilitate the representation of bargainers’ risk attitude. Calvo
and Perers investigated the bargaining problems with mixed players: cardinal players and
ordinal players (Calvo & Peters, 2005). A bargaining solution is called utility invariant
if it is ordinally invariant for the ordinal players and cardinally invariant for the cardinal
players. It is proved that there is a solution satisfying utility invariance, Pareto optimality
and individual rationality provided at least one player is cardinal. Obviously, this result is
only peripheral because a utility invariant solution is not necessarily ordinal invariant.
The other direction of the investigation tries to circumvent Shapley’s impossibility result
by altering the Nash bargaining model. Rubinstein et al. reinterpreted the Nash bargaining
solution with respect to ordinal preferences (Rubinstein et al., 1992). By restating Nash’s
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axioms, it is proved that the redefined solution, referred to as ordinal-Nash solution, sat-
isfies Pareto optimality, symmetry and contraction independence (ordinal invariance holds
trivially). However, the result is based on the assumption that the preference ordering of
each player is complete, transitive and continuous on the set of finite lotteries over a topo-
logical space. It is unclear that how to use such a specific preference language to describe
players’ risk attitudes. More important, the advantages of ordinal preferences, such as ease
of elicitation and robustness of corresponded solutions, may be lost once the preference
ordering is extended to the space of lotteries. O’Neill et al. model a bargaining situation
with a family of Nash bargaining games, parameterized by time (O’Neill et al., 2004). A
bargaining solution is then defined as a function that specifies an outcome at each time.
With the model, bargainers’ risk attitude can be expressed through varying preferences over
time, which is very intuitive. Since a solution is no longer a single point but a function
over time, the construction of the proposed ordinal solution relies on the solution of sets of
simultaneous differential equations.
This work is developed based on a series of previous work of the authors. The fixed-point
condition discussed in this paper was firstly proposed by Zhang et al. (2004)15. Zhang and
Zhang (2006a, 2006b) presented a logical solution to the bilateral bargaining problem based
on ordinal preferences. However, that solution does not satisfy the fixed point condition.
Zhang (2008) showed that a revision of the solution satisfies the fixed-point condition. The
present paper further develops and systemizes the solution and discusses its logical and
game-theoretic properties.
9. Conclusion
We have presented a bargaining solution to the bilateral bargaining problem based on
the logical representation of bargaining demands and ordinal representation of bargainers’
preferences. We have shown that the solution satisfies most desirable logical properties,
such as individual rationality (logical version), consistency and collective rationality, and
the desirable game-theoretic properties, such as weak Pareto optimality, restricted symmetry
and contraction invariance. The ordinal invariance and game-theoretic version of individual
rationality hold trivially. Due to the discrete nature of logical representation, the solution
is not (strictly) Pareto optimal and does not satisfy symmetry. However, if the demand sets
of two players are logically closed, the solution meets a restricted version of symmetry. In
addition, we have demonstrated that under the logical closedness assumption, the outcome
of a negotiation is the result of mutual belief revision in terms of Nebel’s prioritized belief
base revision. This result established a link between bargaining theory and belief revision.
Such a link would play an important role in the future on the research of multiagent belief
revision and logic-based bargaining theory. Our complexity analysis indicates that the
computation of bargaining solution is more difficult than prioritized belief base revision.
A satisfactory model of bargaining should be able to encode the key factors that deter-
mine the bargaining outcome, such as bargainer’s demands, preferences, attitudes towards
15. Jin et al. (2007) also introduced a fixed-point condition for negotiation functions, which says that
under certain conditions, negotiating on the outcome of a negotiation generates the same outcome.
Obviously our bargaining solution satisfies this fixed-point condition because any outcome of bargaining
is consistent, which remains the same in any further negotiation.
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risk and so on. Cardinal utility specifies two sorts of information: preference over possi-
ble agreements (via the ordering of utility values) and risk attitudes (via the non-linearity
of utility function). However, the second sort of information, which determines players’
bargaining power, may be lost after an ordinal transformation. Meanwhile, a bargaining
model based purely on ordinal information about preferences does not automatically solve
the problem because bargainers’ risk attitude is even inexpressible in such a model. There-
fore an ordinal bargaining theory must supply a facility to describe the information other
than ordinal preferences, including risk attitudes. In this paper, we specify a bargaining
situation in logical structure. Bargainer’s demands, goals and beliefs are described in logical
statements. The conflicts of demands between two players can then be identified through
consistency checking. More importantly, bargainer’s attitudes towards risk are expressible
in our model in a natural way: a risk-averse player tends to give a conflicting demand a
relatively lower priority so that an agreement could be more likely reached while a risk-lover
would firmly entrench her demands with less care about whether her demands contradict her
opponent’s.
A few issues are worth further investigation. Firstly, we have shown that our solution
satisfies a set of logical properties and game-theoretic properties. It is interesting to know
whether there is an axiomatic system that exactly characterizes the solution. The main
challenge here is that the construction of our solution is syntax-dependent. If we simply
impose the logical closedness on the demand sets, we will lose a few desirable properties,
such as the inclusion of irrelevant items and computational results. If we do not apply the
assumption, we shall need the axioms to specify the way of logical representation. In other
words, the axioms have to specify how a demand set should be represented syntactically.
Secondly, the present work offers a solution to the bilateral bargaining situations. It
does not supply a model to bargaining agents. Therefore the current framework does not
deal with the issues like “how a demand is formed?”, “why a demand should be ranked
higher than another?” or “how to bargain effectively?”. It is interesting how a logic of
agency can be used or developed to model bargaining agents and how such a logic interacts
with the logic of bargaining.
Finally, a few issues on the computational complexity of the proposed solution remain
unsolved. As we have shown in this paper the membership checking of the solution is DP-
hard but in ∆P3 . It is not clear yet how this upper bound and lower bound gap can be
closed. We think some new complexity proof technique may be needed for this challenge.
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